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JUST WAR AND HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: COMMENT ON THE
GROTIUS LECTURE BY PROFESSOR JEAN
BETHKE ELSHTAIN

*

MICHAEL J. MATHESON"

I want first to thank Professor Bradlow for his kind introduction,
and to thank the Society for the opportunity to comment on
Professor's Elshtain's lecture today. She is clearly a very able
political philosopher who has given a great deal of thought to the
connections between political problems and ethical concepts, and I
think it is very valuable for the international law practitioners and
scholars gathered at this Annual Meeting to have the benefit of that
perspective with respect to the question of humanitarian intervention.
In fact, it is very interesting to compare the elements of Professor
Elshtain's concept of "just war" with the principles of contemporary
international law concerning the resort to armed force and the
conduct of hostilities. For example, her injunction that war must be
only a last resort corresponds to the international legal principle of
necessity, which demands that force not be used if alternative

* Editor's Note: The Following is a revised version of a response to the
Grotius Lecture presented at the American Society of International Law's
("ASIL") 95th Annual Meeting on April 4-7, 2001. The Grotius Lecture Series is
co-sponsored by the American University Washington College of Law, the ASIL,
and the International Legal Studies Program. The purpose of the Grotius Lecture
Series is to open the ASIL forum to distinguished scholars for discussion about
new and important voices that might not be heard in international law and to create
expanded space and opportunities to explore the intellectual underpinnings of
international law and the issues of our time.
** Mr. Matheson is currently a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Peace in
Washington, D.C. Previously, he directed the International Law Program at the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and was Acting Legal
Advisor at the U.S. Department of State.
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peaceful means of accomplishing the same objective are available.'
Likewise, her admonition that war must be waged in such a way as to
minimize harm to non-combatants is reflected in the law-of-war
principles of distinction and proportionality. 2 And so on. If these are
the characteristics of "just war," then all international lawyers are
just warriors.
But of course the application of these principles can be difficult.
The most difficult question for contemporary international lawyers
with respect to humanitarian intervention has been the question of
who may authorize the use of force in pursuit of humanitarian
aims-an issue that echoes the historical just-war question of "right
authority." 3 I think most observers would now agree that it is
essential for the international community to find effective means for
dealing with humanitarian catastrophes that threaten civilian lives on
a massive scale. I think most would say that if the only effective
means for averting such a catastrophe is the use of armed force, such
action should be seriously considered-even in the absence of an
armed attack that would trigger the right of individual or collective
self-defense.
Fortunately, the UN Security Council has ample authority under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to authorize such action, once it
determines that there is a threat or breach of the peace.4 And in fact,
the Council has shown a willingness during the past decade to act on
the basis of a robust appreciation of what might constitute such a
threat. I think it is hard to imagine a humanitarian catastrophe, which
endangers the lives of tens or hundreds of thousands of civilians that

1. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Third Annual Grotius Lecture at The American
Society of International Law and The International Legal Studies Program of the
American University Washington College of Law (2001) in 17 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1 (200 1) (describing the just war principles).
2. See id. at 5-7 (discussing the just war principal of non-combatant
immunity).
3. See St. Augustine of Hippo, Against Faustus the Manichaean XXII. 73-79,
in AUGUSTINE: POLITICAL WRITINGS 222 (Michael W. Tkacz & Douglas Kries,
trans., Ernest L. Fortin & Douglas Kries, eds., 1994) (stating that a war must be
conducted under a legitimate and lawful authority).
4. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51 (creating the authority for the Security
Council to determine threats or breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, and
take action concerning such acts).
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could not validly be judged by the Council to be a threat to the peace.
Unfortunately, even in the post-Cold War period, it has not always
been possible for the Council to exercise this authority. The crisis in
Kosovo was one prominent example. 5 In such a case, international
lawyers have struggled with the question of whether regional
organizations can lawfully authorize the use of force to end a
humanitarian catastrophe-notwithstanding the prohibition in Article
53 of the Charter on "enforcement action" by regional organizations
without the authority of the Security Council.6 They have also
debated whether there are circumstances in which a state or group of
states can lawfully use force for the same purpose-notwithstanding
the prohibition in Article 2(4) of the Charter on the threat or use of
force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations."7 These remain difficult and unresolved
questions that go to the heart of the legitimacy of the use of power
and armed force in the international community.
Generally speaking, four schools of thought have emerged. One
school takes the view that international law permits military
intervention by states or groups of states in such cases and that such
intervention can be morally and politically justifiable. Another
school takes the view that international law does not currently permit
such action, but that it would be desirable to modify the law to
permit such intervention in at least some circumstances, and that
such a modification may now be under way in state practice. A third
school takes the view that international law does not permit such
action and that such action should not be taken in the absence of
authorization by the Council, on the grounds that it would threaten
the peace and the integrity of the legal structure. Finally, a fourth
school takes the view that such intervention is not and should not be
recognized as lawful, but that it would nonetheless be justifiable to

5. See Louis Henkin et al., NATO's Kosovo hIteretwetion, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
824 (1999) (evaluating NATO's unilateral intervention in Kosovo since the U.N.
powers were limited by the threat of a Security Council veto).
6. See U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 1 (providing that with some exceptions
that are no longer relevant, regional agencies cannot take action without the
Security Council's authorization).
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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take such action in extraordinary circumstances, notwithstanding the
lack of legal sanction. Obviously this debate involves fundamental
political and ethical, as well as legal, issues.
Professor Elshtain acknowledges these problems, but the focus of
her lecture is on what she refers to as the "in bello dimensions of the
just war"-that is, the means by which force is used once a decision
is taken to intervene for humanitarian purposes.' This too is an
important area of debate among international lawyers and policymakers. Here Professor Elshtain very rightly reminds us that ethical
considerations must play an important part in policy-making, not
only with respect to the decision to use force in a particular situation,
but also the means by which such force is used and the measures
adopted after the conflict is over. She correctly emphasizes that the
rightness of the cause for which force is used should not obviate a
need to scrutinize the actual effect of the means used to achieve that
just cause.9
Here, however, there is obviously room for differing judgments in
particular cases, and I do find myself in disagreement with Professor
Elshtain's conclusions as to some specific aspects of the Gulf and
Kosovo conflicts. In the case of the Gulf War, Professor Elshtain
seems to accept that the overall level of Iraqi civilian casualtieswhile regrettable in human terms-was tolerable in light of military
requirements. But on the other hand, she evidently considers
unacceptable the civilian casualties produced in the Kosovo
campaign by NATO targeting policies and techniques.
I think there is room for question about some of the specific
tactical decisions made in the Kosovo air campaign. But on the
whole, I do not agree with the extent of Professor Elshtain's
criticism, in light of NATO's acute focus on potential civilian
casualties in its targeting decisions, and the overall low level of
collateral civilian casualties when compared to past air campaigns of
similar scope and intensity. As we know, the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal did not believe that the allegations
8. See Elshtain, supra note 1,at 8-9 (outlining "in bello" rules in just war
tradition such as avoiding targeting noncombatants).
9. See Elshtain, supra note 1, at 8 (stating just war analysis does not end with
whether it is a justifiable cause of substantial importance, the means must also be
considered).
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that NATO violated the principles concerning indiscriminate attack
and distinction in targeting merited further investigation."
Much of Professor Elshtain's criticism focuses on the extensive
and remarkably successful efforts of U.S. commanders to minimize
casualties among its forces, which was so notable in both the Gulf
and Kosovo conflicts. In the case of the Gulf War, she points to the
great disparity between U.S. and Iraqi military casualties. In fact,
U.S. commanders made every possible effort to ensure that it would
not be an even contest, and I see no legal or ethical problem with
this, so long as the casualties inflicted on Iraqi military forces were
reasonably directed at ensuring the success of Coalition operations.
A more significant issue is presented by Professor Elshtain's
assertion that U.S. efforts to protect its pilots in the Kosovo
conflict-which she refers to as "combatant immunity"-led
improperly to higher levels of civilian casualties. Here again, I think
there is room to raise questions about certain NATO tactical
decisions, but on the whole I do not agree with the extent of
Professor Elshtain's criticism. The fact is that NATO commanders
went though an intensive and unprecedented level of scrutiny of their
operations for the purpose of identifying and minimizing civilian
casualties, and I believe this scrutiny was real and not merely
formulaic.
I suppose that the alternative to the NATO air campaign might
have been a ground campaign. And, in fact, I think there is room, on
political and tactical grounds, to question the U.S. announcement at
the outset that it would not conduct ground operations against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Nonetheless, I think it would be a
mistake to think that a NATO ground invasion of Yugoslavia would

10. See FinalReport to the Prosecutorby the Committee Establishedto Review
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2001)

(recommending that no investigation be commenced in relation to the NATO
bombing campaign).
11. See Military Operations in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Limitation Act
of 1999, H.R. 1569, 106th Cong. (1999) (prohibiting the use of Department of
Defense funds from being used for deployment of ground forces in Yugoslavia,
with the exception of missions specifically limited to rescuing U.S. military
personnel or U.S. citizens in Yugoslavia, or rescuing air crew military personnel of
a member nation of NATO).
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have been a vindication of humanitarian principles. We have seen
from the previous armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia that
ground operations in populated areas can be highly destructive to
civilian lives and property. We also know from the Gulf War that the
conduct of a ground campaign does not obviate the need for air
strikes-if anything, it probably necessitates a wider and more
intensive air campaign to ensure the success of ground operations. I2
The bottom line is that, whatever one's degree of regret about
civilian casualties caused by the NATO air campaign-or for that
matter, the violence against Serb Kosovars that has occurred despite
NATO's efforts to deal with it-the NATO campaign still, in the
end, terminated Serb atrocities in Kosovo and brought about the safe
return of hundreds of thousands of Kosovar civilians. It is right to
debate the legal and ethical questions posed by NATO's armed
intervention, but we should not lose sight of these basic facts.
Finally, I agree with Professor Elshtain that it is important to
scrutinize thoroughly the effect of economic sanctions on the civilian
population of the targeted country, and wherever possible to find
alternative means of accomplishing the same objectives with less
harm to civilians. As I understand it, the Bush Administration is
currently looking at ways to do this in the Iraqi context, while still
pursuing the objective of keeping Iraq from acquiring weapons of
mass destruction and other threatening military capabilities."
We should nonetheless be clear-as Professor Elshtain was-as to
where the primary responsibility lies for the deprivation that Iraqi
civilians have suffered during the course of UN sanctions against
Iraq. The Security Council always made exceptions to the embargo
for shipments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and other items of
humanitarian significance, and repeatedly authorized large sales of
Iraqi oil to finance such shipments. Iraq's response for years was to
refuse these offers, and then grudgingly to accept them but to
continue its attempts to discriminate among Iraqi civilians for
the Gulf War, RAND,
at
12. See generally Air Power in
http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB19/RB19.html (analyzing the use of air
power by the United States in the Gulf War).
13. See Sudarsan Raghaven, Power Moves to Alter Iraq Sanctions,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 27, 2001 (stating that Powell sought Arab support

to alter U.N. economic sanctions against Iraq).
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political purposes. The UN can and should do better in its
administration of such sanctions programs, but we need to put the
primary blame where it belongs-which is with the current regime in
Baghdad.
In any event, I hope that these points of difference with Professor
Elshtain over some aspects of her presentation do not overshadow
my appreciation of the thrust of her message. She has reminded us
that decisions on war and peace-and specifically on the conduct of
military operations-must give prominence to ethical as well as
political considerations, and that we can learn much from the
traditional concepts of just-war thinking. As she has so eloquently
pointed out, we can never let the overall justice of a cause obscure
the need to ensure that the means we adopt for carrying out that
cause serve the interests of justice and preserve-to the maximum
extent possible-the safety of the civilian population on both sides.

